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CONSUMER PROTECTION

all persons and institutions involved in consumer credit transactions be subject to the same laws.
Louis ROSENBLOUM
JEFFREY A. CRAMER

PRIVACY OF INFORMATION IN FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
PERSONNEL FILES
The attorney general of the State of Florida has interpreted the Florida
Public Records Act (PRA) to require that personnel files of public employees
be maintained as public records, open to inspection by all., This ruling is
an implicit implementation of the broader public "right to know" what
transpires in government. Because these files contain sensitive personal
information about identifiable employees, 2 however, such indiscriminate disclosure is offensive to established notions of personal privacy. The conflict
between one citizen's right to access to information about his government
and another citizen's right to privacy in his personal affairs is a matter of
serious concern, especially to the thousands of persons employed by the
State of Florida subject to this ruling. This note examines the source and
evolution of the competing public "right to know" and the private "right
to privacy" in an attempt to determine what information held in state
employee personnel files can be legally protected from disclosure.
THE RIGirr To KNow
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives. 3
The cornerstone of popular control in a democratic society is knowledge
of what transpires within government. 4 This "right to know" developed
1. Ops. ATr'y GE'N. FLA. 073-212, 073-51 (1973).
2. See text accompanying notes 89-93 infra.
3. Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in Tim CoMPLTmE MADiSON
337 (S. Padover ed. 1953).
4. See J. WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY viii (rev. ed. 1964). "The people's right to know
really is a composite of several rights. It has at least five broad discernible components: (1) the
right to get information; (2) the right to print without prior restraint; (3) the right to
print without fear of reprisal not under due process; (4) the right of access to facilities
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incrementally in America, resulting from a lengthy struggle to shed the
inherited cloak of secrecy that shrouded English government.5 The old
world system of suppression of information about government included proscription of books, licensing of printing, granting of monopolies, use of
religious injunctions, resort to star chamber proceedings, employment of
general warrants, secrecy in Parliament, and reprisal for seditious libel and
contempt. 6 Parts of this system of secrecy were exported to colonial America,
but gradually vestiges of secrecy succumbed to the active assertion of first
amendment freedoms. Licensing of the press was abandoned, legislative and
judicial proceedings were opened to the public, seditious libel laws were
7
modified, and defenses against libel became available.
As an outgrowth of developing American commitment to the people's
right to know about government, statutory guarantees of access to the records
of both state and federal governments emerged in the form of public record
acts. The federal guarantee, the Freedom of Information Act, 8 is a statutory
application of the right to know about records of the executive agencies of
government. All government agency records are made available for public
inspection by the Act unless expressly exempted by the statute.9 The Act
specifically creates the administrative procedures for examination of agency
records 0 and provides aggrieved citizens a judicial remedy for nondis2closure.11 Although the Act has been severely criticized for certain defects,1
and material essential to communication; and (5) the right to distribute information without
interference by government acting under law or by citizens acting in defiance of the
law.
"Of these rights, the first in order of its exercise, and perhaps the first in order of
importance, is the right to get information." Id. at 3-4.
5. See id. at ix-xii.
6. Id. at ix-x.
7. Id. at x.
8. 5 U.S.C. §552 (1970).
9. The Freedom of Information Act (FIA) exempts matters that are: (1) specifically
required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or
foreign policy; (2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency; (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; (4) trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) interagency or intraagency memoranda or letters that would not be available by law
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; (6) personnel and medical
files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy; (7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes
except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency; (8) contained in or
related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or
for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells. 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (1970). Note that the personal privacy problem caused by the
Florida attorney general's opening of public employee files for inspection by all has been
recognized and dealt with in exemption (6). Apparently exemption (6) has caused little
controversy. See, e.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (balancing test used
by the court to force disclosure of names and addresses of certain employees to be in%ited
by two reputable law professors to participate in a study of union election procedures).
10. 5 U.S.C. §§552(a)-(b) (1970).
11. Id. §552(a)(3).
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it is nonetheless a significant statutory expression of the people's right to
know.
The Florida Public Records Act: State Codifications of the Right To Know
A skeleton of the current Florida Public Records Act (PRA) '3 existed
long before enactment of the federal Freedom of Information Act. 14 The presumption of the early Florida statute that government records are open
to the public underlies the initial section of the PRA: "All state, county,
and municipal records shall at all times be open for a personal inspection
of any citizen of Florida, and those in charge of such records shall not refuse
this privilege to any citizen."' 5 This broad mandate is qualified by the definition of "public records" as those "made or received pursuant to law or
ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any
agency."' 8 Judicial interpretation of the PRA has further limited the right of
inspection by recognizing that "[p]ublic policy demands that some ... [public
records] must be kept secret and free from common inspection."'' Diplomatic correspondence' s and police investigative files' 9 have been included
within this category by the Florida supreme court. Opinions of the attorney
general have used the public policy rationale to deny access to mandatory
disease reports of doctors, 20 certain patient information from state tuberculosis hospitals, 21 auditors' work sheets, 22 hospital clinical records, 23 and
production returns of growers and processors to the Avocado and Lime Com24
mission.
In addition to these public policy exclusions, certain exceptions are expressly delineated in the PRA.25 Exempted are all records "deemed by law
to be confidential or which are prohibited from being inspected by the

12. See Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARv. CIv.
Ri.Irs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 1 (1970).
13. FtA. STAT. §§119.01-.10 (1973).
14. Fla. Laws 1909, ch. 5942, §§1-2, at 132 (equivalent of FLA. STAT. §119.01 in text
accompanying note 15 infra).
15. FLA. STAT. §119.01 (1973).
16. FLA. STAT. §119.011(1) (1973).
17. Lee v. Beach Publishing Co., 127 Fla. 600, 604, 173 So. 440, 442 (1937). An argument
can be made that this public policy doctrine no longer is viable. The doctrine was
formulated prior to the express exceptions added to the PRA in §§119.07(2)(a) and (b) in
1967. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-125, §7. Judicial application of the public policy doctrine today
would affront the rule of statutory construction stating that exceptions will not be implied
when a statute contains express exceptions. Williams v. American Sur. Co., 99 So. 2d 877
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
18. Lee v. Beach Publishing Co., 127 Fla. 600, 604, 173 So. 440, 442 (1937) (dicta).
19. Id. (holding).
20. 1940-1941 FLA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 126.
21. 1957-1958 FLA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNAL REP. (OP. ATr'y GEN. FLA. 058-127 (1958)).
22. 1965-1966 FLA. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 363.
23. 1972 FLA. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 100.
24. 1955-1956 FLA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 588, 589-90.
25. FLA. STAT. §§119.07(2)(a)(b) (1973).
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public . ..by special or general acts." 26 Such statutory privileges from disclosure are numerous. For example, accident reports filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles are for the confidential use of the department.7
Similarly, certain court records concerning mentally disordered sex offenders
are deemed confidential and are available only to public officers and employees in the performance of a public duty.28 Also exempted by the PRA
is information collected under certain specified statutes, 29 including records
concerning rape victims,'3 adoption proceedings,2 1 and certain financial
data.32
The Florida Conflict Between Public and Private Rights
Personnel files of state employees have heretofore been either partly or
totally confidential. Under authorization 33 of a 1950 opinion of the attorney
general,'4 all career service employee files35 were organized into two sections;
one public, one private. The public portion contained general qualifications
and employment history. The private portion, not available for public inspection, contained investigative reports, evaluations, and other similar data.
In March 1973 the attorney general ruled that this dual system could no
longer be maintained, expressly overruling the earlier position. 36 This opinion
mechanically reasoned that such employee files are records generated "in
connection with the transaction of official business" of a state agency, 37 not
26. Id. §2(a).
27. FLA. STAT. §316.066(4) (1973).
28. FLA. STAT. §917.22 (1973).
29. FLA. STAT. §119.07(2)(b) (1973) excludes public records referred to in §794.03 (rape
victims), §198.09 (estate tax returns), §199.222 (intangible personal property tax returns),
§658.10(1) (bank and trust company applications and reports), §§624.319(3)-(4) (insurance
code examinations), §624.311(a) (insurance filings), §63.162(2) (adoption proceedings) from
coverage of the PRA.

30. FLA. STAT. §794.03 (1973).
31. FLA. STAT. §63.162(2) (1973).
32. See note 29 supra.
33. The attorney general is the chief law officer of the state. He is the legal advisor
of the Governor and executive officers of the state. FLA. CONS-. art. IV, §4(c). Although
opinions issued by the attorney general are not judicial utterances, his opinions are entitled
to weight in construing Florida statutes, Perry v. Larson, 104 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1939), and
are guides for state executive and administrative officers in performing their official duties
until superseded by judicial decision. State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Board of
Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681 (1922).
34. 1949-1950 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 165, 166.
35. Personnel administration of state employees is governed by FLA. STAT. §§110.022-.111
(1973). Elected officials, high level state employees, university faculty and administrative
staff, and others ("exempt employees") are excluded from the provisions of chapter 110;
all others are called "career service" employees. Id.
36. Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 073-51 (1973).
37. FLA. STAT. §119.011 (1973) reads: "For the purpose of this act: (1) 'public records'
means all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings or other material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received
pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by
any agency. (2) 'Agency' shall mean any state, county or municipal officer, department.
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exempted by the PRA. The earlier brief opinion implicitly rested on the
the conclusion that public policy justified protection of certain information.3 8
The latter opinion sought to justify reversal on the basis that: "[N]ot only
has the Career Service Commission replaced the Merit System, but the Legislature enacted Chapter 67-125, Laws of Florida, 1967, which amended
Chapter 119, Florida Statutes, by, among other things, adding Section 119.011,
Florida Statutes." 9
Reorganization of the earlier Merit System into the current Career Service
Commission is irrelevant to the issue resolved. 40 The purported distinction
based on the addition of section 119.011 is also misplaced. This section simply
added explicit definitions of "public record" and "agency" where none existed
before.41 However, no question existed at the time of either opinion whether
the employee files were "public records" because clearly they were. The
earlier opinion simply excluded certain portions of these public records from
disclosure on public policy grounds, which the latter refused to do. No
other provision of the 1967 revisions to the PRA provides a logical basis for
this reversal.
Personnel files of university faculty have traditionally been maintained in
a strictly confidential status, without the public-private division present in the
case of career service employees.42 In June 1973 the attorney general addressed
an inquiry regarding university faculty files.43 The ruling was consistent
with position taken concerning career service employees:
[P]ersonnel files (including complaints, references, information concerning promotion qualifications, 44 quality of professional works, [and]
confidential inquiries made by administrative personnel) of faculty
and administrators
of institutions of higher learning are open to
45
public inspection.
division, board, bureau, commission or other separate unit of government created or
established by law." (Emphasis added.)

38. "We come now to the fifth category. .

.

. I would say that the personal file

folders of individual employees could be maintained under two separate headings, the
first to include general qualifications, employment history, etc., which is, I believe,; 'a
public record and should be open to the public, and the second file to contain investigative

reports and similar data which would not be available for general inspection as an
exception to the rule." 1949-1950 FLA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL RFP. 166.
39. Op. ATr'y GEN.FLA. 073-51 (1973).
40. Administrative reorganization of the "Merit System" of personnel management
into the "Career Service System" was accomplished by a complete revision of FLA. STAT. ch.
110 in 1967. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-437, repealing Fla. Stat. ch. 110 (1965). However, no
change therein has relevance to the opinion expressed by the attorney general.
41. See note 37 supra.
42. Interview with Robert Button, Director of Personnel, University of Florida, in
Gainesville, Florida, July 26, 1974.
43. Op. ATr'y GEN. FLA. 073-212 (1973).
44. Apparently recognizing the inconsistency with FLA. STAT. §231.29(3) (1973) requiring
confidentiality of evaluations of county school teachers, the legislature passed FLA. STAT.
§239.78 (1973) to give similar confidentiality for evaluations of university employees. The
attorney general later amended Qp. ATr'y GEN.'FLA. 073-212 -(1973) to reflect this statutory
requirement. Op. ATr'y GEN. FLA. 073-212A (1973).
45.

Op. Arr'y GEN. FLA. 073-212

(1973).
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Thus, it must be concluded that the attorney general is persuaded that
personnel files of all state employees are totally open to public scrutiny.46 This
conclusion follows inescapably from the express wording of the PRA, but
totally ignores the right to privacy of individual employees. In cases of
similar import, past attorneys general have not hesitated to base exceptions
to the statute on public policy grounds47 Here, however, the present attorney
general has ignored such balancing of interests, adhering instead to strict
statutory interpretation. These 1973 opinions necessitate inquiry into whether
any personal privacy interests of public employees can be legally protected
under the law of privacy.
THE RIGHT

To

PRIVACY

Conceptions of an individual's right of privacy are as deeply rooted in
the American democratic process as is the countervailing right to know.
When the Federal Constitution was drafted, American political thought
rested on a series of assumptions drawn largely from the philosophy of John
Locke: the concept of individualism, the principle of limited government,
and the central importance of private property and its linkage with the individual's exercise of liberty. 4 "Each of these guiding ideas had a common

purpose: to free citizens from the unlimited surveillance and control that
had been exercised over 'subjects' by the kings, lords, churches, guilds, and
municipalities of European society." 49
The concept of individual privacy pervades the Constitution, 5 although
nowhere is a guarantee of a general right to individual privacy expounded.
The underlying theme of the Constitution is that the lives of citizens should
be free from unnecessary governmental intrusion. Indeed, as the modern
spokesman of privacy, Mr. Justice Douglas, has said "the right to be let alone
is the beginning of all freedom."51
The observation that "in law, as elsewhere, we can know and not understand," 52 partially explains the conceptual muddle surrounding the evolving
law of privacy.

46. All state employees are classified as career service employees or exempt employees
FLA. STAT. §110.051 (1973). Op. ATT'Y GEN. FLA. 073-51 (1973) dealt with career service
employees. Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 073-212 (1973) concerned university faculty and administrators
who are among several groups defined as exempt employees. FLA. STAT. §110.05 (1973). This
conclusion follows because no logical basis exists for distinguishing university faculty and
administrators from the other categories of exempt employees.
47. See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra. See also argument against validity of the
public policy doctrine in note 17 supra.
48. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOm 330 (1970).
49. id.
50. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (penumbra theory of Douglas,
J.,in plurality opinion).
51. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952). The phrase "the right
to be let alone" was coined by Judge Cooley in T. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).

by

52.

H.

HART, DEFINITION AND THEORY IN JURISPRUDENCE
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Without difficulty we regularly recognize these situations in which a
violation of privacy is threatened or accomplished, yet stumble when
trying to make clear what privacy is. In such a quandry we feel that
we know how to use a word but have difficulty setting straight those...
who misuse it.53
Such difficulties of definition and articulation impede the development and
application of effective legal remedies. The law of privacy in its current
state of development must be characterized as a "thing of threads and
patches," 54- for privacy finds protection within the law only in certain
instances. It is necessary to keep in mind that the law does not determine
what privacy is, but only determines what situations of privacy will be afforded
55
legal protection.
Right To Privacy in Tort
The threads and patches of the law of privacy are being woven from an
American tort law base 56 and a newly recognized constitutional base. The
tort law of privacy can be traced to the demand for a separate right first
verbalized in the famous article of Warren and Brandeis in 1890.57 It was
there argued that the right existed at common law, but under misnomers
of a property or contract right, or breach of trust.58 In 1905 Georgia became
the first state to sanction the independent right advocated by Warren and
Brandeis in Pavesick v. New England Life Insurance Co., 59 which held a
life insurance company liable for the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name,
picture, and spurious testimonial in an advertisement. Gradually other jurisdictions endorsed the tort of invasion of privacy, and in the 1930's, following
adoption by the Restatement of Torts,60 recognition became the majority
position. 01
53. Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 34 (1967).
54. A. Mnrnl, THB ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 169 (1971).
55. General definitions of privacy emphasize control over disclosure of personal information: "I]his is the core of the 'right of individual privacy'-the right of the individual
to decide for himself, with only extraordinary exceptions in the interests of society, when
and on what terms his acts should be revealed to the general public." A. WEsn,, supra
note 48, at 373.
"As a first approximation, privacy seems to be related to secrecy, to limiting the
knowledge of others about oneself. This notion must be refined. It is not true, for instance,
that the less that is known about us the more privacy we have. Privacy is not simply an
absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have
over information about ourselves." Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
56. The tort of invasion of privacy is not recognized in English common law. See
S. Horsnirr
C. HoRowrrz, THE RIGHT OF PRIvAcY 11-13 (1964) for a discussion of the
English position.
57. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HAiv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
58. Id. at 198-211.
59. 122 Ga. 190,50 S.E. 68 (1905).
60. "A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in
not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable

to the other."
61.

REsrATE

W. PROSSER,

ENT

LAW

OF ToRTs §867 (1939).

OF TORTs §117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971). Dean Prosser has analyzed
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Florida first adopted the tort in Cason v. Baskin.12 Female plaintiff Cason
recovered against author Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings 63 for descriptions of her
masculine characteristics, profanity, and eccentric behavior in the novel
Cross Creek. This type of tort action is characterized by public disclosure of
private facts of a highly objectionable nature. Subsequent Florida cases
recognized intrusions giving rise to a tort remedy for invasion of an individual's physical solitude,6 4 publicity that tends to place the plaintiff in
a false light,6 5 and the Pavesick type of appropriation."
Constitutional Right To Privacy
The second root of the tree of privacy springs from the Constitution.
Despite early advocacy by Justice Brandeis of a constitutional right to privacy
as the right "most valued by civilized men ' ' 67 and its denomination as a
"constitutional imperative,"68 an independent constitutional right to privacy
was not recognized until 1965. An embryo of the right is found in early
constitutional concern focused in the fourth amendment protection from
unreasonable search and seizure and the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. In Boyd v. United States- Mr. Justice Bradley held that
the fourth and fifth amendments blended to protect the "sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life." 70 In 1886 Justice Bradley foreshadowed the
theory of the modern constitutional right of privacy when he said:
[I]t is not the breaking of his doors or the rummaging of his drawers
that constitutes the essence of the [Government's] offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right to personal security, personal liberty
and private property . . .which underlies and consititutes . . . [it].1
The privacy afforded by the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure was again the issue in the 1928 wiretapping case of Olmover 400 tort privacy cases. His categorization of these cases serves to mark the general
boundaries of the tort: (1) Appropriation-unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name or
likeness by the defendant, (2) Intrusion - invasion of the plaintiff's physical solitude or
seclusion, (3) Public disclosure of private facts-publicity by the defendant of highly objectionable private material about the plaintiff, (4) False light in the public eye - publicity
that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. Id. at 804-14.
62. 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1945), second appeal, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947).
63. Pen name of Marjorie Kinnan Baskin, a famous Florida author, winner of the
Pulitzer Prize in 1939 for her novel The Yearling.
64. Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1961) (intrusion
by city police).
65. Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955) (bystander
identified as gambler in raid).
66. Battaglia v. Adams, 161 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1965) (unauthorized use of plaintiff's
name on ballot). Thus, Florida has recognized all four of Prosser's categories discussed

in note 61 supra.
67. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 478-79.
69. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
70. ld. at 630.
71. Id.
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stead v. United States.7 2 In dispute was whether evidence obtained without
a warrant by telephone wiretapping violated the protections guaranteed by
the fourth and fifth amendments. The majority found no constitutional
violation, admitting the evidence. In a forceful dissent, Brandeis paralleled
the theme of Boyd:
[he constitutional amendments] ...

conferred, as against the Govern-

ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. And the use of evidence . . . ascertained

by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.73

Despite these eloquent pronouncements, the constitutional "right to be
let alone" had to wait many years for acceptance by a majority of the
Court. In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,74 recognition of an independent constitutional right to privacy finally emerged. Appellant Griswold,
Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, had
given information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons who
sought to prevent conception. As a result, Griswold was convicted under a
state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices. 75 On appeal, Griswold contended the statute violated the constitutional right of the married
couple to use contraceptives.
The plurality opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr. Justice Douglas,
struck down the statute as a violation of the right of privacy of the couples
involved. justice Douglas' now famous penumbral theory created an
independent right of privacy resting on emanations from the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. 78 These emanations create a "zone of
privacy" 77 around an individual that must be free from government intrusion.
The boundaries of the right to privacy enunciated in Griswold were not
dearly defined by the Court, necessitating a case-by-case struggle to mark the
perimeters of the zone of privacy. At a minimum, Griswold created a right
of marital privacy, but confusion prevailed as to the extent and scope of the
right.78 Following Griswold the lower courts diverged, some restricted the
72. 277 US. 438 (1928).
73. Id. at 478-79.
74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

75.

CONN. GEN. STAT. Rv. §53-32 (1958).
76. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).

77.

Id.

78. Part of the confusion surrounding the constitutional right of privacy stems
from vagueness in terminology. For example, the term "right of privacy" is often applied
to reference the "penumbra" generating rights of the first, third, fourth, and fifth: amendments as well as the independent Griswold right of privacy; In Stark v. Connelly, 347 F.
Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972), for instance, the claimed deprivation of the right to privacy
by the Bank Secrecy Act was based on fourth amendment search and seizure consideration.
Such duality of meaning only serves to hamper understanding of the independent right
to privacy. In this note the term "right to privacy" applies only to, the' independent
Griswold right..
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holding to marital relations, 79 at least one held the right applied to extramarital heterosexual relations,80 and a few courts hesitantly suggested that
the right also might protect homosexual relations81
Seven years after Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird 2 presented an opportunity
for the Court to clarify the breadth of the right to privacy. Baird had been
convicted under a Massachusetts statute83 prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons. Appellant contended that the statute
violated the right of privacy and denied equal protection to unmarried persons. Although the Supreme Court avoided the privacy issue, holding the
statute void on equal protection grounds, a dictum in Baird did give focus
to the right:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity . . .but an associa-

tion of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governa person as
ment intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
4
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.3
Shortly after Eisenstadt, this dictum emphasizing the individual's right
to be free from government intrusion in the decision to bear or beget a child
became a mandate of the Supreme Court. In Roe v. Wade,85 the Court voided
the Texas criminal abortion statute, holding the decision to have an abortion to be within the zone of privacy of the mother. The Court did not seem
particularly concerned about the doctrinal basis of the right of privacy
saying:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amend-

ment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as
we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy . .

..

Wade is the latest Supreme Court holding contributing to definition of
the boundaries of the right of privacy. Since Wade the Supreme Court has
addressed the right of privacy only peripherally, but has, in dictum, summarized the status of the evolving constitutional right to privacy:

79. See, e.g., Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873, 875 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 393 U.S.
847 (1968) (limiting Griswold to "private, consensual, marital relations').
80. Mindel v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (leinstating postal clerk dismissed for living with unmarried woman).
81. See, e.g., McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1046 (1972); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1969); In re Labody,
326 F. Supp. 924, 929 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
82. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
83. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §§21-21A (1970).
84. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
85. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86. Id. at 153.
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[The constitutionally protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just concerned with a
particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship. Such
protected privacy extends to the doctor's office, the hospital, the hotel
room, 8or
as otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy in7
volved.
This abridgement by the Court defines what is really a right to personal
autonomy-a right to be free from interference within a protected intimate
relationship. Members of the class of protected relationships continue to
seek recognition on a case-by-case basis.88
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FiLEs: WHAT

RIGHT OF PRIVACY?

Public employee files of the State of Florida contain a great wealth of
personal information about an individual. Files may include application
forms, medical records, credit reports, psychological and other test results,
criminal records, job and salary histories, confidential inquiries, recommendations and performance evaluations. 9 Part of this information is supplied
directly by the employee90 with the remainder coming from outside sources.
Some information is gathered with the permission of the employee, 91 and
some as a result of independent nonconsensual state inquiry. 92 Records of
past abortions, rape, homosexual conduct, psychiatric disorders, and arrests
constitute file information that an employee might consider sensitive and
not wish open to public view. Credit records alone may contain information
on "drinking, marital discords, adulterous behavior, general reputation,
[and] habits and morals." 93 Thus, information within an employee's file
may range from highly personal to purely routine, from fact to hearsay. Indiscriminate disclosure of such information could be devastating to an individual's reputation and career.
Recent opinions of the Florida attorney general have opened all such
public employee records to the scrutiny of the public. 94 Litigation triggered
by these rulings will force the Florida courts to answer the question: What
right of privacy exists?95
87. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973).
88. For instance, in Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), a
court for the first time explicitly extended the right of privacy to homosexual behavior.
89. Interview with Robert Button, Director of Personnel, University of Florida, in

Gainesville, Fla., July 26, 1974.
90. E.g., the initial application submitted by an employee and answers given on
psychological and achievement tests. Id.

91. Waivers are normally signed authorizing release of medical and other information
to the state. Id.
92. Credit records and independent references are often sought by the state without
the express consent or knowledge of the employee. Id. Such outside information, without
review by the employee, can introduce erroneous information into the file.
93. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. 2410 (1969).
94. See text accompanying notes 35-44 supra.
95. The first case to raise the issue is the recent case of Wisher v. News-Press Publishing
Co.,
So. 2d
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1975). This appeal followed issuance by the circuit
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Tort Privacy Remedies
Legal remedies for disclosure of personal information traditionally are
found in state tort law. 96 The tort action of invasion of privacy for disclosure of
personal information gives a cause of action for unprivileged publicity of
highly objectionable private information. 97 An array of defenses, however,
restrict the effectiveness of this tort remedy in the situation of Florida public
employee files.
The defense of "public record" seriously limits the usefulness of this
tort remedy, for the fact that the information disclosed came from a public
record of the state may defeat the cause of action. 98 One court summarized
this defense saying: "[M]anifestly an individual cannot claim a right to privacy
with regard to that which cannot ...

by operation of law remain private."' 99

Information from birth certificates and marriage licenses,100 court 0 1 and
tax records 02 have been held to be public records, defeating tort actions in
other jurisdictions. Thus, the classification of employee files as public records
would, in general, prevent recovery under a tort action for invasion of
privacy.
When information covered by a statutory provision of confidentiality is
found within a public record, however, an action in tort for disclosure may
be maintainable despite the defense of "public record." This seemingly narrow
court of a writ of mandamus compelling the administrator of Lee County to open the
county's personnel files to News-Press Publishing Co. (the Fort Myers News-Press). The
district court of appeal reversed, denying the writ on the ground that public policy required these files to be confidential (see text accompanying notes 19-21 supra, and an
argument against the validity of this public policy doctrine in note 17 supra). Additionally,
the rationale of the court can be criticized on several grounds. First, the court finds support
for the judicially created public policy doctrine in FLA. STAT. §119.07(2)(a) (1973), a section
endorsing current and future legislative exceptions to the PRA. Second, the decision fails
to recognize any public right to know what is contained in county employee records, regardless of the type of information. To the court there are no levels of sensitivity of data
within the files-only open or shut. On appeal this case could provide the Supreme Court
of Florida an opportunity to clarify the privacy rights of state employees in their personnel
files.
96. Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966). The tort of defamation will
not be discussed in detail because of its limited potential for protecting personal information. Truth is a complete defense in Florida to defamation, where publication is with good
motive. FLA. CONST. art. I, §4. Thus, defamation would lie only for defamatory publication
of erroneous information obtained from an employee file, or where malice could be ploved.
In such an action against the state the fatal defenses of qualified privilege, see Leonard v.
Wilson, 150 Fla. 503, 8 So. 2d 12 (1942), or sovereign immunity, see McNays v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d
428 (Fla. 1966), would bar recovery. Against a third party republisher of information so
released by the state, the defense of constitutional privilege would have to be overcome, see
text accompanying notes 107-114 infra.
97. Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
98. Id. at 717.
99. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 311, 95 P.2d 491, 495 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1939).
100. Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
101. Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962).
102. Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1966).
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remedy may be pertinent in the employee file situation because the Florida
10 3
statutes demand confidentiality of certain information collected by the state.
One such early statute limited access to affidavits and other records of a
narcotic commitment proceeding.' 04 In Patterson v. Tribune Co. 0 5 a Florida
district court held the defendant newspaper liable for publication of the
name of an addict voluntarily committed to a drug rehabilitation program.
The court rejected the defense that the court docket from which the information was obtained was a public record, 06 holding that the specific provisions
of confidentiality superseded the general statutory assertion that the docket
was a public record.
Publication by a newspaper of statutorily protected information obtained
from a public employee file would produce a situation directly analogous
to Patterson. This precedent would give an employee a cause of action
against a third party republisher of such information. However, since the
subject individuals are public employees, the additional defense of constitutional privilege, not raised in Patterson, would have to be surmounted.
The doctrine of constitutional privilege can be viewed as the embodiment of the people's "right to know" in tort privacy cases. This doctrine,
first recognized in defamation actions, spread to privacy actions involving
disclosure, and now applies equally to both. 07
The privilege is grounded in the common law privilege of "fair comment"
about the conduct and qualifications of public officers and employees. 08 In
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"°" the Supreme Court elevated this privilege
to constitutional status, holding the first amendment granted newspapers a
qualified privilege to comment about public officials. The qualification to
the privilege is that the publisher must act without malice in the sense
that he must not act in conscious or reckless disregard for the truth. This
privilege to comment about public officers and employees in a defamation
context was sQon. extended to invasion of privacy actions in Time, Inc. v.
Hill' 0 and cases following.
103. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
104. Fla. Laws 1933, ch. 16,087, §17 (repealed 1973).
105. 146 So. 2d 623 -(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
106. See FLA. STAT. §§28.19(2), 119.01 (1973).
107. W. PRossm, supra note 61, §118, at 827.
108. White v. Fletcher, 90 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1956) (policeman); Hoeppner v. Dunkirk
Printing Co., 254 N.Y; 95, 172 N.E. 139 (1930) (high school football coach).
109. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
110. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Hill extended in an invasion of privacy action the constitutional privilege to "public figures" and "news or matters of public interest." "A public
figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living,
or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his
doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.' " W. PaossER, supra
note 61, §118, at 823. The privilege as to "news or matters of public interest" focuses on
the event, fact, or subject matter in which a person is involved, rather than the person
himself. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), brought the privilege back to
defamation actions for "public figures." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971),
did the same for private persons associated with news. The recent defamation action of
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974), however, has implicitly reversed Rosen-
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In Florida, comment about all public employees is protected by constitutional privilege.1 1' Thus, in any tort action analogous to Patterson the statute
mandating confidentiality would be subject to the challenge of unconstitutionality as applied to a public employee. Not all types of information, however, even about public employees, necessarily fall within the scope of
constitutional privilege. In Ocala Star Banner Co. v. Damron11 2 a district
court held that only those matters bearing on public life are privileged.
Damron, a candidate for public office, had been awarded damages by the
trial court for defamatory allegations of past criminal conduct. Because the
article did not associate Damron in any way with his campaign for public
office, the second district court affirmed, holding the conduct outside the
scope of constitutional privilege. After the Florida supreme court refused to
hear the case,' 13 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the district court, holding the publication privileged because the
information had a reasonable relationship to Damron's public life.'

4

Im-

plicit in this holding is the conclusion that only those matters reasonably
related to public life are constitutionally privileged. Thus, comment about
all Florida public employees is constitutionally protected, but the scope of
the privilege depends on the relationship of the information to his public
life. For public employees this scope must be considered to vary with the
level of the employee. The range of issues bearing on the qualifications of a
state-employed laborer, for example, are narrower than the range relevant
to the qualifications of a university president.
These formidable defenses against a claim of invasion of privacy, make it
clear that only a very narrow tort remedy exists for disclosure of personal
information from employee files. Where statutorily protected information,
not bearing on public life, is disclosed from an employee file the rule of
Pattersonwill afford legal protection. The narrowness of this remedy motivates
a search for a broader remedy under the maturing constitutional right to
privacy.
Constitutional Privacy Remedies
The constitutional right to privacy in its current state of development
shields individuals from unnecessary governmental intervention in private
decisionmaking within a protected intimate relationship such as the family,
marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child bearing.11 5 The right is a shield
bloom as to private persons associated with newsworthy events. The holding should be

applicable to privacy actions as well.
111. Kenneth v. Barker, 159 Fla. 81, 31 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1947) (holding comment about
a fireman privileged, the court said, "anyone who seeks public employment." Id. at 83, "1
So. 2d 44, 46, is subject to privileged comment). Cf. White v. Fletcher, 90 So. 2d 129 (Fla.
1956) (policeman); Bishop v. Wometco Enterprises, Inc., 235 So. 2d 759 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970)
(city investigator).
112. 221 So. 2d 459 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969).

113. 231 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1970).
114. 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
115. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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from government intrusion.But the threat to the public employees of Florida
is one of disclosure of personal information. This distinction makes clear that
none of the Supreme Court privacy cases are directly in point when searching
for a remedy from disclosure of information. Wade, for example, held the
decision to have an abortion to be within the protected relationship of motherhood. Wade did not say to what degree the right to privacy protects a mother
from forced disclosure of information about an abortion. The Supreme
Court has not yet dealt with a case involving disclosure of information about
a relationship protected by the independent constitutional right to privacy."16
In the absence of Supreme Court direction, it is necessary to look to state
and lower federal courts for precedent applicable to the employee file situation. 11 In recent years an increasing number of cases have attempted to
protect personal information from disclosure through claimed deprivation
of the constitutional right to privacy. In analyzing these disclosure privacy 18
cases it is necessary to look first at the relationship from which the information
sought to be protected originates. If that relationship falls outside the

116. A cursory look at the case of California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 94 S. Ct.
1494 (1974), seems to contest this statement. In California Bankers petitioners challenged
the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§1730d, 18296, 1951-59
(1970) and 31 U.S.C. §§1051-1122 (1970), requiring, inter alia, mandatory recordkeeping of
all bank transactions and routine reporting to the government of transactions over $10,000.
A three-judge federal district court, 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972), held these provisions
violated the "right of privacy" of the bank customers, but used the term in its generic
sense, see note 78, basing the decision on fourth amendment search and seizure considerations, not upon any analysis of the independent right of privacy. The Supreme Court
reversed as to the recordkeeping requirements, finding a sufficient nexus to sustain due
process between the evil Congress sought to address and the mandatory recordkeeping
provisions. Various challenges to the reporting provisions were dismissed as premature, or
for lack of standing. See 94 S. Ct. at 1515-25, for discussion. Since the Supreme Court's
rationale in California Bankers was also framed in terms of the fourth amendment, the
holding contributes little to a search for protection under the independent right to privacy.
Negatively, California Bankers does indicate that neither the advocates nor the courts were
willing to attempt to bridge the gap from financial disclosure to the independent right
of privacy as rationale for relief. Only Justice Douglas attempted to show a nexus, and only
half-heartedly at that. 94 S. Ct. at 1530-32 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
117. Two recent cases, analogous to the Florida public employee factual situation,
offered the potential for circuit court decisions in disclosure privacy settings. In Sanders
v. Wyman, 464 F.2d 488 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1942), welfare recipients
sought to challenge unauthorized disclosure of information from files of the New York
Housing Authority. Similarly, in Council No. 34 v. Ogilve, 465 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1972),
a union representing public employees of the state sought to challenge a financial disclosure
law that would allegedly "expose the private lives" of certain of its members to public
view. Unfortunately, neither case reached the merits: Sanders was dismissed as moot and
Council No. 34 was dismissed on standing. In Council No. 34 petitioners would probably
have experienced difficulty in bridging the gulf between the financial data sought to be
protected and the intimate relationships protected by the right to privacy. Sanders, however,
would have directly raised the disclosure privacy issue in a very similar factual situation
to that posed by the opening of state employee files, had the merits been reached.
118. The term "disclosure privacy" will hereafter be used to denote a case brought
under the independent constitutional right to privacy for unauthorized disclosure of
arguably personal information,
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boundaries of the right to privacy, the logical conclusion is that any related
disclosure will find no constitutional protection.
Larmont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehiclesl19 illustrates the result to be
anticipated when attempting to protect information about a relationship
totally beyond the boundary of constitutional protection. Plaintiff contended
the state's sale of motor vehicle registration records for the ultimate purpose
of use by mail order houses violated his right to privacy. Although this unauthorized use of personal information would offend general conceptions of
privacy1 20 Larmont's contentions were dismissed as insubstantial. The court
found no constitutional issue and stated: "The mailbox, however noxious its
advertising contents seem to judges as well as other people, is hardly the kind
of enclave that requires constitutional defense to protect the privacies of
life."121 The court in Larmont found the information sought to be protected
so far removed from the relationships protected under the constitutional right
to privacy as to preclude serious consideration. Clearly, automobile ownership does not give rise to a protected relationship under the constitutional
right to privacy. Similar privacy arguments concerning social security
123
have also been rejected. 24
numbers 12 2 and fingerprint disclosure
Where the information disclosed is about a protected relationship, however, courts find more difficulty resolving the issue. A recent series of New
York lower court cases present the problem of disclosure of personal information concerning legal abortions.
Schulman v. New York City Health & Hospital Corp.125 held invalid a
New York City administrative regulation requiring disclosure of the name
119. 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968).
120. See general definitions of "privacy" in note 55 supra.
121. 269 F. Supp. at 883.
122. Cantor v. Supreme Court, 353 F. Supp. 1307, 1321-22 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
123. Thorn v. New York Stock Exch., 306 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per
curiam sub nom., Miller v. New York Stock Exch., 425 F. Supp. 1074 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 905 (1970).
124. Another group of disclosure privacy cases concluding that the source of the
information disclosed does not fall within the constitutionally protected relationships
arise from attempted civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970). Maintenance of the
action depends on a deprivation of a constitutional right through state action. Thus, the
courts are forced to decide what does or does not violate the right to privacy. Decisions
denying jurisdiction include Rosenburg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1978), wherein
the court denied a prisoner's complaint that information given to the newspapers about
the crime for which he was convicted violated his constitutional right to privacy. The
court found the information disclosed did not afford a constitutional remedy, because
"[t]hus far only the most intimate phases of personal life have been held to be constitutionally protected." Id. at 524-25. Cf. Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (publication of prisoner's photograph not constitutionally
protected); Felber v. Foote, 321 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1970) (doctor-patient relationship
not constitutionally protected); Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966) (disclosure of parole hearing by television not constitutionally protected).
125. 70 Misc. 2d 1093, 335 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1972), vacated and remanded, 41 App.
Div. 2d 242, 341 N.Y.S.2d 242, judgment reinstated, 75 Misc. 2d 150, 346 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup.
Ct. 1973).
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and address of the mother of an aborted fetus in a document called-a "fetal
death certificate." The regulation dearly involved disclosure of information
to the Government about a relationship within the constitutional right to
privacy. Holding the regulation to be an unconstitutional invasion of the
right to privacy, the court reasoned that such disclosure inhibited the woman's
choice to have a legal abortion. The court found no compelling state interest
sufficient to override this right to privacy.
The potential for damage through disclosure of this sensitive information
by the Government was of particular concern to the Schulman court. Rejecting
the city's claim that the information would not be disclosed, the court pointed
out that the health code itself provided conditions where the information
may be made available to various agencies for criminal action or scientific
purposes. Additionally there was no assurance that this "private register"
would not become subject to subpoena and thereby be made public. 20 The
court summarized its position, balancing in favor of privacy:
The embarrassment, social stigma and humiliation that would ensue
from any public revelation of the woman's identity is hardly countervailed by the respondent's contention . .. that such identification is
needed to compile statistical data of the possible adverse effect of
multiple abortions upon the same woman .... 127
The court, in essence, protected this right of confidentiality as a fundamental
right against a less than compelling state interest.
The appellate division vacated and remanded 12 for reconsideration in
light of the intervening Supreme Court decision in Wade. On remand, the
lower court affirmed its earlier holding that disclosure of the patient's name
was in no manner supportive of the state's compelling interest: "Rather, it
would diminish the grant of privacy in respect of the woman's body and
the right to be shielded from disclosure of her exercise of that right of
29
privacy."1
Apparently not satisfied with the New York City result in Schulman, the
State of New York sought enforcement of a similar state regulation in another
county, using a slightly different approach. In State v. Jacobus.,"3 Dr. Jacobus
and others had refused to comply with the state disclosure regulation, omitting
the name and address of parents of the aborted fetuses. The state sought
civil penalties and a permanent injunction. The Jacobus court held that the
disclosure did not invade a fundamental right of the mother. The court
recognized implicitly a distinction between intrusion and disclosure, saying:

126. The court used as an example a recent situation where supposedly confidential
drug records of methadone patients were successfully subpoenaed by the Manhattan district
attorney. Id. at 1098, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 347-48.
127. Id. at 1097, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
128. 41 App. Div. 2d 714, 341 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1973).
129. 75 Misc. 2d 150, 154, 346 N.Y.S.2d 920, 924 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
130. 75 Misc. 2d 840, 346 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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The Roe rv. Wade] and Doe rv. Bolton] cases indicate that the kind of
regulation limiting the right to privacy the rSupreme] Court was condemning was of a very different nature from the mere reporting of an
abortion operation with identifying information.'3'
Because the right in question was deemed less than fundamental, the court
looked only for a rational relationship to a legitimate state end. The court
had little difficulty in finding one: "The State's expressed intention to use
the data thus obtained for purposes of promoting public health is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose." 132 The court expressly disagreed with
Schulman, holding the disclosure constitutional. Significantly, however, the
Jacobus court refused to enforce the regulation. The complaint was dismissed
with summary judgment for the defendants because of the possibility of subsequent disclosure of this sensitive information by the state:
Although the issuance of death certificates is supposedly limited to those
showing some interest entitling them to receive such documents, it
appears that this rule is easily circumvented .... Inquiry at the Department of Health locally indicates that 33 information concerning such
identity may be rather easily obtained.1
Schulman and Jacobus both indicate a new judicial concern for the
ultimate confidentiality of any sensitive information disclosed to the Government. Schulman, however, held protection from disclosure about a relationship within the right to privacy to be a fundamental right, while Jacobus,
on indistinguishable facts, held the opposite. Nevertheless, both courts voiced
the same concerns, balancing the possible harm to the mother, given the
existing potential for disclosure, with the interests of the state, and decided
not to enforce the disclosure regulation as it existed.
At least one federal district court has also held a protected relationship
immune from disclosure under a right to privacy theory. In Merriken v.
Cressman,134 plaintiffs, a high school student and his mother, brought an
action claiming a proposed high school drug prevention program would
violate their constitutional right to privacy in their family relationship. The
program required the student to fill out a questionnaire concerning details
of family life. Tipping the balance in favor of plaintiffs were the court's
opinion that the program was less than creditable and its concern over the
ultimate confidentiality of the data.
Probably the largest group of disclosure privacy cases reaching the federal
courts has been generated by state requirements that mothers of illegitimate
children disclose the name of the biological father prior to receipt of welfare
benefits for the child. 13 5 Doe v. Norton 3 6 is a case typical of this group. In
131. Id. at 845, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
132. Id. at 845, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
133. Id. at 846, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
134. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
135. E.g., Saiz v. Goodwin, 325 F. Supp. 23 (D.N.M. 1971); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F.
Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969). See discussion of similar cases in Saiz, 325 F. Supp. at 27.
136. 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973).
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Norton, plaintiffs, mothers of illegitimate children, challenged the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute requiring disclosure to the state of the
child's father and initiation of a paternity suit prior to receipt of welfare
benefits. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the forced disclosure invaded their
right of privacy relating to the protected relationship of procreation. The
court in rejecting their plea applied different standards to this disclosure of
information than would have been applied to direct government intrusion
into the same relationship:
The object of the inquiry is to enforce a familial monetary obligation,
not to interfere with personal privacy. There is no intrusion into the
home nor3 7any participation in interpersonal decision among its
occupants
The court weighed what it saw as a legitimate interest of the state-enforcement of the parental support obligation of the father-and the fact that the
"embarrassing" information had in large part been widely disclosed before
any inquiries by the state, concluding that the disclosure did not impinge
on any fundamental privacy right. Norton, like Jacobus, utilized a lower
threshold to force disclosure about a protected relationship than is applied
to government intrusion into the same relationship.
In the cases discussed above, analysis of whether the information concerns
a protected relationship is a useful first step in determining whether a court
will afford relief from disclosure under the constitutional right to privacy. In a
minority of decisions involving arrest records, however, this logic falters.
State courts in Colorado and Washington have concluded that arrest records
of unconvicted individuals are protectable under the right of privacy. In
Davidson v. Dill-8s the court upheld the sufficiency of a complaint seeking
to expunge such records and remanded to the trial court. In Eddy v. Moore 39
the court ordered expunction of the records themselves. Both rested on the
constitutional right to privacy, yet there is no logical way to conclude that
being arrested involves a relationship protected by the constitutional right
to privacy. These decisions have used the right loosely to effect justice, but
without detailed analysis. A partial explanation of these holdings can be
found in the general confusion that surrounded the right prior to the more
140
recent clarifications of Wade and Paris Adult Theater.
Balancing in Disclosure Privacy Cases
In reviewing this confusing mass of lower court cases, several criteria of
the judicial balancing process emerge. The first criterion is whether the information sought to be secreted concerns a protected intimate relationship
within the constitutional right to privacy. This criterion is, however, far
137. Id. at 77.
138. 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972).

139. 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
140. See text accompanying notes 78-88 supra.
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from outcome determinative. 14 1 As the cases discussed above indicate, other
factors enter the judicial decision process. Two of these are the sensitivity
of the data disclosed and the scope of disclosure.
The sensitivity criterion reflects an intuitive reaction on the part of the
and private the data disclosed really is. The more
court to how personal
"vital and intimate ' ' 1 42 the data the more likely a court is to protect it from
disclosure. The scope criterion relates to the number of persons informed by
a given disclosure; the larger the group privy to the information the larger
the scope of disclosure. The larger the scope of the disclosure, the more con14 3
cerned the courts become about the privacy implications of the disclosure.
Thus, sensitivity and scope can be viewed as second and third criteria of the
balancing process in disclosure privacy cases.
A fourth factor, the degree to which disclosure inhibits or chills free
decision within the protected relationship, was employed in Schulman and
Jacobus, and must underlie other decisions. If it is assumed that the more
"vital and intimate" the information disclosed, the greater the chilling effect,
then this fourth criterion mirrors the sensitivity criterion. The Jacobus court,
however, found no substantial chilling effect on the right to abortion though
the information disclosed was objectively of a highly sensitive nature. It
appears, therefore, that chilling effect should be viewed as a criterion of
independent analytical value, often related to the sensitivity of the disclosed
4 4

information.1

In the case of public employees of the state, one important final element
must be considered. That element is the public's right to know about a given
employee. The right to know must be viewed as a spectrum, increasing from
low-level employees to higher officials. This element of the balance embodies
the same public concerns and first amendment rights that generate the constitutional privilege to comment about public officers and employees in tort defamation and privacy actions. It is equally applicable to disclosure actions
under the constitutional right to privacy.
141.
have an
410 U.S.
holding
142.

E.g., both Schulman and Jacobus dealt with abortion records. The decision to
abortion is clearly within the protected relationship of motherhood. Roe v. Wade,
113 (1973). However, Schulman and Jacobus reached opposite results, Schulman
the disclosure unconstitutional, and Jacobus, constitutional.
Larmont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y.

1967).
143. The concern of the court in Jacobus about indiscriminate disclosure by the
Government is a reflection of this criterion. 75 Misc. 2d 840, 846, 346 N.Y.S.2d 907, 913

(Sup. Ct. 1973).
144. Whenever a substantial chilling effect of the right to privacy can be shown, the
Supreme Court's holding in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), should be compelling
precedent to protect an individual from unauthorized disclosure. In NAACP the state of
Alabama sought to force disclosure of the names and addresses as of all members of the
organization, without regard to position or function within the organization. The Supreme
Court held such disclosure would violate the right of freedom of association, a fundamental right under the first amendment. In other Supreme Court cases the same rationale
has been used to protect the right of association, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm'n,
372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960). Application of this rationale necessarily depends on the degree of "chill"
found by the court to exist.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/7

20

Gay: Privacy of Information in Florida Public Employee Personnel Files
1975]

PRIVACY OF INFORMATION

Applying these criteria to disclosure of personnel information from the
files of Florida public employees, it is apparent that these files contain a large
amount of routine data, analogous to the motor vehicle registrations in
Larmont. No constitutional protection need be afforded this information.
Certain other file information, such as arrest, credit and financial data, is
admittedly of a sensitive nature, but does not concern a constitutionally
protected relationship. Such data will also find no protection under the right
to privacy as currently enunciated. A third category, however, information
about constitutionally protected relationships-the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child-rearing, and perhaps relationships on the verge
of recognition, notably homosexuality-should in certain cases be protectable
under the right to privacy. Open public records containing*such information
can present the two extremes of sensitivity and scope of disclosure: extremely
sensitive data exposed to anyone who cares to look. Where some level of
chilling effect can be .demonstrated, and the nexus to employee qualification
for service is weak, the constitutional right of privacy must prevail over the
public right to know about state employees.
CONCLUSION

Employee files contain a large amount of sensitive information, disclosure
of which offends inherent concepts of personal privacy. Such invasions of
personal privacy are justifiable when reasonably related to the right to know
about state employees. However, the attorney general's interpretation of
the PRA requiring that public employee personnel files be public records
lacks any recognition of a need for balancing the interests of personal privacy
and the right to know.
The search for legal privacy remedies to protect public employees from
indiscriminate disclosure of personnel file information is less than rewarding.
In tort, a remedy exists where statutorily confidential information is disclosed
from an employee file, if it is not significantly related to the public career
of the employee. Under the constitutional right of privacy, protection should
exist where the information, not bearing on qualification for employment, is
disclosed about a protected intimate relationship. For the public employees
of the-State of Florida, these narrow remedies appear to stand alone to give
legal definition to the intuition expressed by the Supreme Court that "some
aspects of the lives of even the most public- man fall outside the area of
145
niatters-of general or public concern."
M. LEE GAY, JR.

145.

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 48 (1971).
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